Political Change Part 4 Finale: Agenda Dynamics

Presidential candidates for the 2008 election continue to posture about political change. I started this series by suggesting that claims to be agents of significant change are overblown.

In order to justify this position, I have described a groundbreaking theory describing political change in the US by Dr. John Kingdon. In previous postings, I reviewed Kingdon’s description of relevant actors in the arena of public policies and his taxonomy of key process streams: (1) defining problems (or setting agendas); (2) developing policy solutions; and (3) politics. Omitting details, the processes that drive agenda formation and resolution of problems are lengthy and complex. All three streams feature elements that are largely unpredictable.

In this last posting, we review Kingdon’s celebrated “garbage can” model, which explains how the process streams interact with one another. Kingdon’s model makes it painfully clear just how difficult it is for “change agents” to drive, much less control, political processes to produce desired laws. His thesis, in a nutshell, is that timing is (nearly) everything. The “garbage can” moniker refers to Kingdon’s model of process stream dynamics. He writes:

“These three streams each have lives of their own. Problems are recognized and defined according to processes that are different from the ways policies are developed or political events unfold. Policy proposals are developed according to their own incentives and selection criteria, whether or not they are solutions to problems or responsive to political consideration. Political events flow along on their own schedule and according to their own rules, whether or not they are related to problems or proposals.

There comes a time when the three streams are joined. A pressing problem demands attention, for instance, and a policy proposal is coupled to the problem as it solution. Or an event in the political stream calls for different directions. At that point, proposals that fit with that political event (e.g. initiatives that match a new administration’s philosophy) come to the fore and are coupled with the ripe political climate. Similarly, problems that fit are highlighted and others are neglected.

… At points along the way there are partial couplings: solutions to problems, but without a receptive political climate; politics to proposals, but without a sense that a compelling problem is being solved; political and problems both calling for action, but without an available alternative to advocate. But the complete joining of all three streams dramatically enhances the odds that a subject will become firmly fixed on a decision agenda (ready for legislative enactment or presidential choice).”

Thus, Kingdon argues that political change is much more likely to take place in periods when “policy windows” open up due to brief alignments of the three streams; these are the times when leaders or policy champions can push attention to their problems or to their favored solutions. Problem and political windows may be unpredictable, opening up due to unforeseen events such as disasters or scandals, or anticipatable, for example, when programs come up for on schedule for renewal. These windows are brief and scarce. “Opportunities come but they also pass. Windows do not stay open for long. If a chance is missed, another must be awaited” because “the system” is loaded down with problems and proposals.

Clearly, other factors play roles in agenda dynamics. For example, do problems or solutions align with other items in other streams, so that they reinforce each other? Can solutions be applied to multiple problems? Numerous social and institutional constraints impose structure on how participants play their games in the three streams. These include the public mood; preferences (and intensity of opposition) of special interests and elected officials; rules (constitution, laws, procedures); and last but not least economics – what is the current budget, how tight or flexible is it, and how much do prospective solutions cost? Like the political stream, these factors are probabilistic, not absolute; they affect relative likelihood of attention and/or success.

Bottom line:

If you have stuck around this long (bless you!), you may well ask “what’s the point?” My answer is (relatively) brief.

First, Kingdon’s work is inherently interesting: it is well-grounded in field research and very creative. Academic theories often tend to reduce complex phenomena to a unitary explanation: the world is like X (or Y). For example, policy is driven by special interests and/or “great men”. In contrast, Kingdon’s model seems credible (to me at least) because it features a plausible mixture of structure (process) and random elements (timing, Darwinian selection of ideas). This hybrid model displays a level of complexity that matches the real (political) world.

Second, my original contention that talk of political change is cheap requires justification, or else I am guilty of the same kind of posturing as the presidential candidates. Kingdon’s theory explains why candidates’ claims to be agents of large scale policy changes should be viewed with great skepticism. It predicts what is likely to happen if and when they try. Their political capital, time in office, and potential windows to exploit are all limited.

Finally, Kingdon’s theory provides a defense against the unreasonable expectations that presidential candidates are raising about significant change and reform. Absent plans or some indication of what is required to bring about change, current claims are either disingenuous or naïve. In either case, they pave the way for broad disappointment, anger, and more cynicism in a newly energized voting population. Given the scale of the problems facing us both domestically and internationally, we can ill afford these types of disillusioned reactions. Caveat emptor.