Political Change Part 4 Finale: Agenda Dynamics

Presidential candidates for the 2008 election continue to posture about political change. I started this series by suggesting that claims to be agents of significant change are overblown.

In order to justify this position, I have described a groundbreaking theory describing political change in the US by Dr. John Kingdon. In previous postings, I reviewed Kingdon’s description of relevant actors in the arena of public policies and his taxonomy of key process streams: (1) defining problems (or setting agendas); (2) developing policy solutions; and (3) politics. Omitting details, the processes that drive agenda formation and resolution of problems are lengthy and complex. All three streams feature elements that are largely unpredictable.

In this last posting, we review Kingdon’s celebrated “garbage can” model, which explains how the process streams interact with one another. Kingdon’s model makes it painfully clear just how difficult it is for “change agents” to drive, much less control, political processes to produce desired laws. His thesis, in a nutshell, is that timing is (nearly) everything. The “garbage can” moniker refers to Kingdon’s model of process stream dynamics. He writes:

“These three streams each have lives of their own. Problems are recognized and defined according to processes that are different from the ways policies are developed or political events unfold. Policy proposals are developed according to their own incentives and selection criteria, whether or not they are solutions to problems or responsive to political consideration. Political events flow along on their own schedule and according to their own rules, whether or not they are related to problems or proposals.

There comes a time when the three streams are joined. A pressing problem demands attention, for instance, and a policy proposal is coupled to the problem as it solution. Or an event in the political stream calls for different directions. At that point, proposals that fit with that political event (e.g. initiatives that match a new administration’s philosophy) come to the fore and are coupled with the ripe political climate. Similarly, problems that fit are highlighted and others are neglected.

… At points along the way there are partial couplings: solutions to problems, but without a receptive political climate; politics to proposals, but without a sense that a compelling problem is being solved; political and problems both calling for action, but without an available alternative to advocate. But the complete joining of all three streams dramatically enhances the odds that a subject will become firmly fixed on a decision agenda (ready for legislative enactment or presidential choice).”

Thus, Kingdon argues that political change is much more likely to take place in periods when “policy windows” open up due to brief alignments of the three streams; these are the times when leaders or policy champions can push attention to their problems or to their favored solutions. Problem and political windows may be unpredictable, opening up due to unforeseen events such as disasters or scandals, or anticipatable, for example, when programs come up for on schedule for renewal. These windows are brief and scarce. “Opportunities come but they also pass. Windows do not stay open for long. If a chance is missed, another must be awaited” because “the system” is loaded down with problems and proposals.

Clearly, other factors play roles in agenda dynamics. For example, do problems or solutions align with other items in other streams, so that they reinforce each other? Can solutions be applied to multiple problems? Numerous social and institutional constraints impose structure on how participants play their games in the three streams. These include the public mood; preferences (and intensity of opposition) of special interests and elected officials; rules (constitution, laws, procedures); and last but not least economics – what is the current budget, how tight or flexible is it, and how much do prospective solutions cost? Like the political stream, these factors are probabilistic, not absolute; they affect relative likelihood of attention and/or success.

Bottom line:

If you have stuck around this long (bless you!), you may well ask “what’s the point?” My answer is (relatively) brief.

First, Kingdon’s work is inherently interesting: it is well-grounded in field research and very creative. Academic theories often tend to reduce complex phenomena to a unitary explanation: the world is like X (or Y). For example, policy is driven by special interests and/or “great men”. In contrast, Kingdon’s model seems credible (to me at least) because it features a plausible mixture of structure (process) and random elements (timing, Darwinian selection of ideas). This hybrid model displays a level of complexity that matches the real (political) world.

Second, my original contention that talk of political change is cheap requires justification, or else I am guilty of the same kind of posturing as the presidential candidates. Kingdon’s theory explains why candidates’ claims to be agents of large scale policy changes should be viewed with great skepticism. It predicts what is likely to happen if and when they try. Their political capital, time in office, and potential windows to exploit are all limited.

Finally, Kingdon’s theory provides a defense against the unreasonable expectations that presidential candidates are raising about significant change and reform. Absent plans or some indication of what is required to bring about change, current claims are either disingenuous or naïve. In either case, they pave the way for broad disappointment, anger, and more cynicism in a newly energized voting population. Given the scale of the problems facing us both domestically and internationally, we can ill afford these types of disillusioned reactions. Caveat emptor.

Political Change Part 3 Change Agenda Processes

Our last installment on Political Change introduced Dr. John Kingdon and his pioneering research on political agenda-setting in the United States (Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (first published 1984, updated second edition in 2003). Agenda-setting represents the first phase of carrying out change – convincing national constituencies that a problem (or opportunity) exists that deserves public and political attention and action.

In our last posting, we reviewed Kingdon’s taxonomy of visible and “hidden” agenda participants. Kingdon argued that visible actors such as candidates tend to influence the contents of agendas (i.e. the topics for focus), whereas the hidden actors (academics, lobbyists, career civil servants) affect the alternatives.

In this posting, we will discuss Kingdon’s contributions in defining the key processes involved in defining and responding to public policy agenda setting. At the highest level, Kingdon defined three distinct but interacting “streams” of processes, labeled problems, policies, and politics: people recognize problems; they generate proposals for public policy changes; and they engage in such political activities as election campaigns and pressure group lobbying.

He observes that: “Problem recognition is critical to agenda setting: The chances of a given proposal or subject rising on an agenda are markedly enhanced if it is connected to an important problem. Some problems are seen to be so pressing that they set agenda all by themselves. Once a particular problem is defined as pressing, whole classes of approaches are favored over others, and some alternatives are highlighted while others fall from view. So policy entrepreneurs invest considerable resources bringing their conception of problems to officials’ attention and trying to convince them to see problems their way. The recognition and definition of problems affect outcomes significantly.”

As to politics, Kingdon writes that “political events flow along according to their own dynamics and rules, independent of problem recognition or the development of policy proposals. Participants perceive swings in the national mood, elections bring new administrations to power and new partisan or ideological distributions to Congress, and interest groups of various descriptions press (or fail to press) their demands on government.”

Thirdly, the policy stream is where alternative responses to agenda problems are generated and narrowed. Based on his research, Kingdon argues that the policy stream is dominated by hidden participants such as analysts and lobbyists, who specialize in particular areas and issues.
This is a key point for our discussion of political change and campaign politics: presidents – and presidential candidates – have relatively little importance from a creative perspective in this area of public policy.

Kingdon writes: “The generation of policy alternatives is best seen as a selection process, analogous to biological natural selection.” He compares policy development with the kind of “primeval soup” of organic chemicals that preceded the appearance of life on earth: many ideas float around, bump into one another, and form new combinations and recombinations.
In short, the origins of policy “seem a bit obscure, hard to predict, understand and structure.”

However, selection – namely the policy options that emerge from the soup is not that mysterious. Specifically, selection criteria for accepting or discarding options include: technical feasibility, alignment with community values, and the anticipation of “future constraints” including budget realities, politicians’ receptivity, and acceptability to special interests and the general public.

Thus, proposals are evaluated in terms of political support and opposition, as well as logical criteria. In addition, proposals typically take a while to “cook”: Kingdon suggests that “recombination (the coupling of already familiar elements) is more important than mutation (the appearance of wholly new forms). Thus entrepreneurs, who broker people and ideas, are more important than inventors. A long softening-up process is critical to policy change.”

Finally, Kingdon points out the different process dynamics dominate these three streams. Specifically, when participants recognize problems or settle on certain policy alternatives, they do so primarily on the basis of persuasion: “they marshal indicators and argue that certain conditions ought to be defined as problems, or they argue that their proposals meet such tests as technical feasibility or value acceptability.” In contrast, in the political stream, “participants build consensus by bargaining – trading provisions for support adding elected officials to collations by giving them concessions that they demand, or compromising from ideal positions that will gain wider acceptance.”

To review what Kingdon has explained so far about political change:

* Presidents -and candidates- are but two types of actor in very crowded political environments
* These actors can exert significant influence, but primarily in setting problem agendas
* Developing solutions to problems and gaining acceptance for them is a lengthy, hard process
* Presidents are not likely to be key players here, much less expediters.
* The political stream is largely independent of agenda setting and solution development

Our next (and final!!) installment on this topic will add one final element of complexity to the mix, namely how the problem definition, solution development, and political streams interact with one another. I believe that this is Kingdon’s most important contribution to the theory of public policy. To give you a preview – as a reward for your patience – what dynamics adds to the complexities already raised is the brute fact that timing is everything.